cordon-cli
MCP ServerFreeThe security gateway for AI agents — firewall, auditor, and remote control for MCP tool calls
Capabilities9 decomposed
mcp tool-call interception and policy enforcement
Medium confidenceIntercepts outbound tool calls from MCP clients before execution, evaluates them against declarative security policies (allowlists, denylists, parameter constraints), and blocks or permits execution based on policy rules. Operates as a proxy layer between the AI agent and MCP servers, inspecting call signatures, arguments, and metadata without modifying the MCP protocol itself.
Operates as a transparent MCP proxy that enforces policies at the protocol level without requiring changes to client or server code; uses declarative policy syntax that maps directly to MCP tool schemas for precise parameter-level control
More granular than generic API gateways because it understands MCP tool semantics; simpler to deploy than building custom security middleware into each agent application
human-in-the-loop approval workflow for tool calls
Medium confidenceRoutes flagged or high-risk tool calls to a human reviewer for explicit approval before execution, with configurable risk scoring and escalation rules. Implements a queue-based approval system where pending calls are held until a human reviews and approves/rejects them, with timeout and fallback policies for unreviewed requests.
Integrates approval workflow directly into the MCP call path rather than as a separate audit system; uses configurable risk scoring to determine which calls require approval, reducing approval fatigue for low-risk operations
More integrated than post-hoc audit logging because it blocks execution until approval; lighter-weight than full workflow orchestration platforms because it's purpose-built for MCP tool calls
comprehensive audit logging and call tracing
Medium confidenceRecords all tool-call attempts (approved, denied, executed, failed) with full context including caller identity, tool name, arguments, decision rationale, execution result, and timestamps. Logs are structured and queryable, supporting export to SIEM systems, compliance databases, or audit dashboards for forensic analysis and compliance reporting.
Captures audit context at the MCP protocol level, recording both policy decisions and execution outcomes in a unified log; supports structured logging with queryable fields rather than unstructured text logs
More complete than application-level logging because it captures all tool calls regardless of agent implementation; more compliance-ready than generic audit logs because it understands MCP semantics and tool call context
dynamic policy configuration and hot-reload
Medium confidenceAllows security policies to be updated without restarting the gateway or interrupting active agent operations. Policies are loaded from configuration files or APIs, validated against a schema, and applied to new tool calls immediately upon update. Supports versioning and rollback of policy changes.
Implements zero-downtime policy updates by loading new policies in parallel and switching atomically, rather than requiring gateway restart; includes policy validation before activation to prevent invalid policies from blocking all calls
Faster incident response than alternatives requiring restart or redeployment; safer than manual policy editing because validation prevents invalid policies from being activated
parameter sanitization and constraint enforcement
Medium confidenceInspects tool-call arguments against declared constraints (type, length, regex patterns, value ranges, allowed values) and either rejects calls that violate constraints or sanitizes arguments to safe values. Supports custom sanitization functions for domain-specific validation (e.g., path traversal prevention, SQL injection detection).
Operates at the MCP argument level with awareness of tool schemas, enabling type-aware validation and sanitization; supports both declarative constraints (JSON Schema) and imperative custom validators for complex rules
More precise than generic input validation because it understands tool semantics; more flexible than hardcoded validation because constraints are declarative and reusable across tools
tool-call rate limiting and quota enforcement
Medium confidenceEnforces per-agent, per-tool, or global rate limits on tool-call frequency, preventing resource exhaustion and abuse. Supports multiple rate-limiting strategies (token bucket, sliding window, quota-based) with configurable time windows and burst allowances. Tracks usage across distributed agents via shared state.
Implements rate limiting at the MCP gateway level with awareness of tool identity and agent identity, enabling fine-grained per-tool and per-agent quotas; supports multiple rate-limiting algorithms to match different use cases
More granular than API-level rate limiting because it can enforce per-agent quotas; more efficient than application-level rate limiting because it blocks calls before they reach the tool
tool-call result inspection and output filtering
Medium confidenceInspects tool execution results before returning them to the agent, detecting and filtering sensitive data (credentials, PII, API keys) or suspicious patterns. Can redact, mask, or reject results based on configurable rules, preventing agents from exfiltrating sensitive information or being poisoned by malicious tool responses.
Operates on tool results at the MCP protocol level, filtering before the agent receives data; supports both pattern-based detection (regex, data types) and custom validators for domain-specific sensitive data
More effective than agent-level filtering because it catches exfiltration attempts before the agent can log or process data; more transparent than application-level redaction because it operates at the gateway
agent identity and authentication verification
Medium confidenceVerifies the identity of agents making tool calls through multiple authentication methods (API keys, JWT tokens, mTLS certificates, OAuth) and enforces per-agent access control policies. Maps authenticated agents to roles or permissions that determine which tools they can access and under what constraints.
Integrates agent authentication directly into the MCP call path, enabling per-agent access control without requiring changes to agent code; supports multiple authentication methods to accommodate different deployment scenarios
More granular than network-level authentication because it enforces per-agent policies; more flexible than hardcoded access control because policies are declarative and updatable
tool-call dependency tracking and circular-call prevention
Medium confidenceTracks the call graph of tool invocations to detect circular dependencies (Tool A calls Tool B which calls Tool A) and prevent infinite loops. Maintains call stack context across the MCP gateway to identify when an agent is attempting to call a tool that's already in its execution path.
Operates at the MCP gateway level with full visibility into the call graph, enabling detection of circular calls regardless of agent implementation; tracks call context across the entire execution path
More effective than agent-level loop detection because it operates at the gateway and can block calls before execution; more complete than timeout-based detection because it identifies circular patterns immediately
Capabilities are decomposed by AI analysis. Each maps to specific user intents and improves with match feedback.
Related Artifactssharing capabilities
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@aiclude/mcp-guard
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@mcptoolgate/client
MCP Tool Gate client for Claude Desktop - secure MCP tool governance with human-in-the-loop approvals
imara
Runtime governance layer for AI agents — audit trails, policy enforcement, and compliance for MCP tool calls
Best For
- ✓teams deploying AI agents in production environments with security-sensitive operations
- ✓enterprises requiring tool-call governance and compliance auditing
- ✓developers building multi-tenant AI systems where different agents need different tool access
- ✓regulated industries (finance, healthcare) where AI actions must be human-auditable
- ✓teams running autonomous agents that need oversight without full manual control
- ✓organizations building AI systems for non-technical stakeholders who need visibility
- ✓regulated organizations requiring SOC 2, HIPAA, or PCI-DSS compliance
- ✓security teams investigating AI agent behavior anomalies
Known Limitations
- ⚠Policy evaluation adds latency to each tool call — synchronous blocking required before execution
- ⚠No built-in machine learning-based anomaly detection — relies on static policy rules only
- ⚠Policies must be manually authored; no automatic policy generation from usage patterns
- ⚠Does not prevent indirect attacks via tool chaining or multi-step exploitation
- ⚠Introduces blocking latency — tool execution is delayed until human approval, potentially minutes or hours
- ⚠Requires operational overhead to staff approval queues and handle SLA expectations
Requirements
Input / Output
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The security gateway for AI agents — firewall, auditor, and remote control for MCP tool calls
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