| Ecosystem |
| 0 |
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| Match Graph | 0 | 0 |
| Pricing | Free | Free |
| Capabilities | 6 decomposed | 9 decomposed |
| Times Matched | 0 | 0 |
Implements a whitelist-based security model that validates HTTP/HTTPS fetch requests against a configurable allowlist before execution. The MCP server intercepts fetch calls and checks the target URL against permitted domains/patterns, blocking any requests to unlisted resources. This prevents LLM agents from accidentally or maliciously accessing local file:// URIs, internal IP ranges (127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), or metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254).
Unique: Implements MCP-native fetch security by intercepting tool calls at the protocol level rather than wrapping fetch libraries, enabling transparent enforcement across any LLM client using the MCP standard without code changes to the LLM application
vs alternatives: More effective than application-level fetch wrappers because it enforces policy at the MCP boundary, preventing bypass via direct library imports or alternative HTTP clients
Detects and blocks requests to local file:// URIs and private IP address ranges (RFC 1918: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, plus loopback 127.0.0.1 and link-local 169.254.0.0/16). The implementation parses the target URL, extracts the hostname, resolves it to IP addresses, and checks against a hardcoded list of private/reserved ranges. This prevents LLM agents from reading /etc/passwd, accessing localhost services, or querying cloud metadata endpoints.
Unique: Combines DNS resolution with hardcoded private IP range checks to catch both hostname-based and direct IP-based attempts to access local resources, preventing bypass via IP spoofing or direct 127.0.0.1 usage
vs alternatives: More comprehensive than simple regex URL blocking because it resolves hostnames to IPs, catching attacks that use localhost aliases or DNS rebinding techniques
Implements a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that intercepts fetch tool calls before they reach the underlying HTTP client. The server acts as a middleware layer in the MCP message flow, validating each fetch request against security policies and either allowing it to proceed or returning a blocked response. This architecture allows the security layer to be transparent to the LLM client and enforces policy consistently across all LLM applications using the MCP standard.
Unique: Operates at the MCP protocol layer rather than wrapping HTTP libraries, enabling transparent security enforcement that works with any LLM client supporting MCP without requiring changes to the LLM application code
vs alternatives: More portable than library-level wrappers (e.g., wrapping node-fetch) because it enforces policy at the protocol boundary, making it language-agnostic and compatible with any MCP-compliant client
Provides a configuration mechanism to define allowed URLs using exact matches, wildcard patterns, or regex expressions. The implementation loads allowlist rules from a configuration file or environment variables, then evaluates incoming fetch requests against these rules using pattern matching. This allows operators to define fine-grained policies such as 'allow api.example.com but not api.example.com/admin' or 'allow any subdomain of trusted-domain.com'.
Unique: Supports multiple pattern matching syntaxes (exact, wildcard, regex) in a single allowlist, allowing operators to express policies at different levels of specificity without requiring separate configuration files
vs alternatives: More flexible than hardcoded domain lists because it supports wildcard and regex patterns, enabling operators to express complex policies like 'allow any subdomain of example.com except admin.example.com' without code changes
Allows approved fetch requests to proceed to the target server and returns the HTTP response (status code, headers, body) to the LLM agent. The implementation validates the request against security policies, then uses a standard HTTP client (node-fetch, requests, etc.) to execute the request and stream the response back through the MCP protocol. This ensures that only security-approved requests reach external services.
Unique: Combines security validation with transparent HTTP passthrough, allowing approved requests to execute without modification while blocking unauthorized requests at the MCP boundary
vs alternatives: More secure than direct fetch access because it validates every request before execution, whereas unrestricted fetch allows agents to access any URL
When a fetch request violates security policies (e.g., targets a blocked IP range or unlisted domain), the MCP server returns a detailed error message explaining why the request was blocked and what policies apply. The implementation catches policy violations, constructs a human-readable error response, and returns it through the MCP protocol. This helps developers understand why their LLM agents cannot access certain resources and guides them toward compliant API usage.
Unique: Provides policy-aware error messages that explain not just that a request was blocked, but why it was blocked based on specific security rules, helping developers understand and work within security constraints
vs alternatives: More helpful than generic 'access denied' errors because it explains the specific policy violation and guides developers toward compliant alternatives
Executes SQL queries against Supabase PostgreSQL instances through the Model Context Protocol, translating natural language or structured query requests into parameterized SQL statements. Uses MCP's tool-calling interface to expose database operations as callable functions with schema validation, enabling LLM agents to perform CRUD operations, joins, and aggregations with automatic connection pooling and credential management through Supabase client SDK.
Unique: Exposes Supabase PostgreSQL as MCP tools with automatic credential injection from Supabase client SDK, eliminating manual connection string management and enabling seamless LLM-to-database queries within Claude or compatible agents
vs alternatives: Tighter integration than generic SQL MCP servers because it leverages Supabase's built-in authentication and connection pooling rather than requiring separate database credential configuration
Exposes Supabase Auth session state and user metadata through MCP tools, allowing agents to inspect current authentication context, retrieve user profiles, and trigger auth-related operations. Integrates with Supabase's JWT-based auth system to validate sessions and access user claims without re-authenticating, using the Supabase client's built-in session management.
Unique: Integrates Supabase's JWT-based auth system directly into MCP tool interface, allowing agents to inspect and act on auth state without managing separate credential stores or re-authentication flows
vs alternatives: More seamless than generic auth MCP servers because it leverages Supabase's built-in session management and avoids redundant credential passing between agent and auth system
Invokes Supabase Edge Functions (serverless TypeScript/JavaScript functions) through MCP tools, passing parameters and receiving results with optional streaming support. Uses Supabase's edge function HTTP API to trigger functions with automatic authentication headers and response parsing, enabling agents to execute custom business logic without embedding it in the agent itself.
Supabase scores higher at 42/100 vs Secure Fetch at 20/100.
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Unique: Exposes Supabase Edge Functions as MCP tools with automatic authentication and response parsing, allowing agents to invoke custom serverless logic without managing HTTP clients or credential injection
vs alternatives: More integrated than generic HTTP MCP tools because it handles Supabase-specific authentication, error handling, and response formatting automatically
Subscribes to real-time changes on Supabase tables through MCP's event streaming interface, using Supabase's PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY mechanism to push INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE events to agents. Maintains persistent WebSocket connections and filters events by table and row-level policies, enabling agents to react to database changes without polling.
Unique: Bridges Supabase's PostgreSQL LISTEN/NOTIFY real-time system with MCP's tool interface, enabling agents to subscribe to database changes without managing WebSocket connections or event serialization
vs alternatives: More efficient than polling-based approaches because it uses Supabase's native real-time infrastructure rather than repeated database queries
Manages files in Supabase Storage buckets through MCP tools, supporting upload, download, list, and delete operations with automatic authentication and path-based access control. Uses Supabase's S3-compatible storage API with built-in support for public/private buckets and signed URLs for temporary access, enabling agents to handle file I/O without managing cloud storage credentials.
Unique: Exposes Supabase Storage's S3-compatible API as MCP tools with automatic authentication and signed URL generation, eliminating the need for agents to manage cloud storage credentials or generate temporary access tokens
vs alternatives: More integrated than generic S3 MCP tools because it leverages Supabase's built-in bucket policies and authentication rather than requiring separate AWS credentials
Performs semantic similarity searches on vector embeddings stored in Supabase PostgreSQL using pgvector extension, translating natural language queries into embedding vectors and executing cosine/L2 distance searches. Integrates with embedding providers (OpenAI, Cohere) or uses pre-computed embeddings, enabling agents to retrieve semantically similar documents or records without full-text search limitations.
Unique: Integrates pgvector directly into MCP tools with automatic embedding generation and distance calculation, enabling agents to perform semantic search without managing separate vector database infrastructure
vs alternatives: More efficient than external vector databases (Pinecone, Weaviate) for Supabase users because it colocates embeddings with relational data, reducing network latency and simplifying data synchronization
Exposes Supabase database schema information through MCP tools, allowing agents to discover table structures, column types, constraints, and relationships without manual schema documentation. Queries PostgreSQL information_schema and Supabase metadata tables to dynamically generate schema descriptions, enabling agents to construct valid queries and understand data relationships.
Unique: Queries Supabase's PostgreSQL information_schema directly through MCP tools, enabling agents to dynamically discover and adapt to database schemas without pre-configured schema definitions
vs alternatives: More flexible than static schema definitions because it reflects live database state, including recent migrations or schema changes
Enforces Supabase Row-Level Security policies within agent queries, ensuring that agents can only access rows permitted by RLS rules defined in the database. Evaluates policies based on authenticated user context (JWT claims, user ID) and applies WHERE clause filters automatically, preventing unauthorized data access at the database layer rather than application layer.
Unique: Delegates authorization enforcement to PostgreSQL RLS policies rather than implementing authorization in agent code, ensuring that data access rules are centralized and cannot be bypassed by agent logic
vs alternatives: More secure than application-level authorization because RLS is enforced at the database layer, preventing accidental data leaks even if agent code has bugs
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